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III. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals 
ignored the fact that a Certification that Trial Transcript is 
Not Needed on Appeal and attached hereto had been filed in the 
Appellate Court. 
2. Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals 
ignored the fact that the transcript had been sent to the Court 
of Appeals as per enclosure marked Exhibit 2 and entitled 
"Reporters Notice of Filing Appeal Transcript". 
IV. 
OFFICIAL REPORT 
This case is reported at State v. Garza 173 Utah adv. 
reporter 25 (CA 11791). 
V. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION. 
The Court of Appeals opinion was filed on November 7, 1991. 
The Court of Appeals filed its Order denying Appellants petition 
for Re-Hearing on December 11, 1991. 
This Court has power to grant Certiorari pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF THIS CASE. 
On August 18, 1989, Appellant, April Garza, herein filed a 
Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained as a result of a Search 
Warrant covering both appellant's residence and those materials 
2. Said equipment included glassware and some chemicals. 
After they had purchased said equipment, April Garza and Foster 
Leonard were stopped while traveling North on Interstate 15 just 
North of American Fork. 
3. The reason given for the stop was that they were 
speeding in excess of 70 mph in a 50 mph zone. It was further 
alleged by law enforcement that April Garza and Foster Leonard 
were seen at intertech Chemical while purchasing items, and their 
behavior was such that they were thought to be purchasing 
chemical manufacturing materials for elicit purposes. 
4. It was further stated by police that it looked that 
April Garza and Foster Leonard were hiding equipment in the back 
of the truck so as to avoid observation. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The ruling of the Appellate Court citing that there was a 
failure to provide the Appellate Court with a transcript of the 
Hearing on the Motion to Suppress. Rule 12 [Transmission of the 
Record.] Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states as follows: 
Duty of the Trial Court Clerk in Criminal Cases. In 
criminal cases, all of the original papers and the index prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) will be transmitted by the clerk of the 
trial coxirt to the clerk of the appellate court upon completion 
of the transcript under paragraph (a) above or, if there is no 
transcript, within 20 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. 
On January 28, 1991, as per enclosure herein, marked Exhibit 
1, Leslie Nelson indicated by filing reporters notice of filing 
a notice that said transcript had been filed with the District 
Court on the 28th of January, 1991. (Exhibit B> ) Based on the 
receipt of this document, it was assumed by counsel herein that 
the transcript had been forwarded to the Appellate Court. In 
reviewing those materials on file at the Appellate Court# it has 
been determined that there are two separate files. One for 
Foster Leonard, co - defendant, and one for April Garza, 
appellant. Counsel herein can only assume that those materials 
needed for April Garza's Appeal were in fact filed under Foster 
Leonard. 
The Appellate Court in its opinion states as follows: "We 
cannot review the proceedings below without an adequate record. 
Defendant's failure to provide us with a transcript makes it 
impossible for us to even verify that a conditional plea was 
properly entered as defendant contends." (Exhibit £3L_J 
It should be noted that in Appellant's Brief, under that 
section designated "Statement of Case", Appellant herein covers 
both the nature of the case and the facts therein. This is 
simply a matter of not properly titling the respective section 
but a review of page 4 and 5 of Statement of Case (Exhibit D ) 
would indicate that all of the facts necessary to proceed forth 
on Appeal are enclosed therein. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the Court of Appeals based its opinion on the 
erroneous conclusion that there was no transcript on file when in 
fact, the record indicates that a transcript with all of the 
respective materials had been advanced to the Court as is 
required by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Still the issue 
in the case is whether the appeal should have been considered on 
3 
the merits. The Appellant Court continually refers to the fact 
that there is no record. If in fact there was no record in April 
Garza's case it was because it had been sent or filed in the Co-
defendant's case, Foster Leonard. For these reasons this Court 
should grant a Petition Request for Writ of Certiorari and Review 
the actions of the Court of Appeals in this case. 
Further in State v. Steaaell 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983) 
Justice Durham states in dictum as follows: "Because of the 
seriousness of this criminal conviction we note that not 
withstanding counsels failure to direct attention to the portions 
of the record relied on we have in fact read the entire Trial 
Transcript." That particular dictum was not part of the decision 
but indicates that the Court has considered the importance of 
Criminal Cases as being sufficient to proceed past a failure to 
cite to the record. 
DATED and SIGNED this /^ ? 7 day of February, 1992. 
KDEAN N. 2AB&ISKIE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cerify that on this the day of February, 
1992, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing document, to the following: 
JUDITH ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Secretary 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
April Garza, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
NOV 71991 
Noonan 
the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publicat ion) 
Case No. 900562-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 7, 1991) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable George E. Ballif 
Attorneys: Dean N. Zabriskie, Provo, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H. Atherton, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Russon, 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant April Garza appeals f 
of her motion to suppress certain ev 
the trial court's denial 
ice. We affirm. 
Defendant asserts in conclusory terms that bo^h~the 
warrantless search of her vehicle and the warrant search of her 
residence violated her constitutional rights to be free from 
illegal searches and seizures. 
Defendant has not taken issue with the trial court's 
findings of fact and has failed to provide this court with a 
transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress, therefore, 
we must assume, as a matter of law, that the trial court's 
decision to deny that motion, was not erroneous. See Jolivet v. 
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. 
110 S. Ct. 751 (1990) (court assumes regularity of 
proceedings below where appellant fails to provide adequate 
record on appeal) (citing State v. Miller. 718 P.2d 403, 405 
(Utah 1986); State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); 
state v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)). See also State 
v. Steggell/ 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983) (court assumes 
correctness of judgment below if counsel on appeal fails to cite 
to record); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982) (court 
assumes correctness of findings when defend^-4- ' s ^ ~ief contained 
nothing more than defendant's version of tacts found by trial 
court). 
While this may seem like a harsh result, we cannot review 
the proceedings below without an adequate record. Defendant's 
failure to provide us with a trangrrip^ makes it impossible for 
us, for example, even to verify that a conditional plea was 
properly entered, as defendant contends. In State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), this court acknowledged that the use 
of conditional guilty pleas by criminal defendants was a sound 
and sensible practice, "if agreed to by the prosecution and 
accepted by the trial court." Id. at 938 (emphasis added). We 
review rulings on pre-plea motions to suppress only when such a 
plea "entered by the defendant with the consent of the 
prosecution and accepted by the trial judge specifically 
preserves the suppression issue for appeal and allows withdrawal 
of the plea if defendant's arguments in favor of suppression are 
accepted by the appellate court[.]" Id. In State v. Bobo, 803 
P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990), this court stated that "[a] defendant 
seeking appellate review pursuant to a conditional plea bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the conditional nature of the plea 
is unambiguously established in the trial court record." Id. at 
1271 (citations omitted). 
In this case, because defendant has not supplied us with the 
requisite record, we do not review the denial of her motion to 
suppress. Our decision not to consider the merits of defendant's 
issues on appeal is further bolstered by the fact that she failed 
to include a statement of facts in her brief, as required by Rule 
24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Neither does 
defendant's brief contain any citations to the record. In 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 965 Utah App.) (Jackson, 
J., concurring), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), the 
author of this opinion commented that "[t]he time will mpst 
assuredly arrive when a panel of this court will be constrained 
to disregard intolerable and unacceptable briefs and not reach 
the merits of the case." Id. In English v. Standard Optical, 
814 P.2d 613, 618-19 (Utah App. 1991), we overcame any 
trepidation that may have been present about declining to reach 
an issue and made clear that when an appellant's argument 
contains no citations to the record and no legal authority, and 
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as such does not comply with briefing rules, we would decline to 
reach those issues.1 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
is affirmed. 
Mn rW -
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
c&**^^ 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
I concur in the court's opinion. I write separately because 
this is a criminal case, and I believe in such cases we should be 
somewhat less fastidious in insisting upon compliance with 
technical requirements as a condition to reaching the merits. I 
would not be comfortable denying a criminal defendant any 
meaningful exercise of her constitutional right to an appeal 
merely because of superficial deficiencies in the brief prepared 
by her attorney. 
That point having been made, I hasten to add this is not 
such an instance. I found it impossible to glean from her brief 
what appellant's basic contentions are on appeal. Insofar as it 
is true that her complaint is about the legality of certain 
searches, where she takes no issue with the court's findings 
(something she could not, as a practical matter, do without a 
1. See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)("The argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, with citations to the authorities, statues, and 
parts of the record relied on."); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 
1352 (Utah App. 1991); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 72-73 
(Utah App. 1991); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.. 746 P.2d 
1182, 1184-85 (Utah App. 1987). 
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transcript) there is little we can do. If the findings were 
inadequate, we would remand for adequate **~**'nct*i. See, e.g. . 
State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah *pp. 1990). If the 
findings supported only a legal conclusion that the searches, or 
one of them, was illegal, we would reverse. See, e.g.. State v. 
Elder. 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah App. 1991). Neither scenario 
seems present here and nothing in appellant's brief serves to 
convince me otherwise. 
One other point merits comment. The problems attending an 
inadequate brief can sometimes be ameliorated with a helpful 
presentation at oral argument. See, e.g.. Demetropoulus v. 
Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 n.6 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied. 
Rone v. Demetropoulus. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). In this case, 
under circumstances which inspire little confidence, we had the 
benefit of oral argument only by counsel for the State. As 
counsel's cavalier attitude concerning this court's calendaring 
requirements is not unique, I want to take the occasion to point 
up the argument protocol the j*iges of this court expect. The 
protocol is premised on the notion that appellate argument is a 
rather significant event in the life of an attorney. 
Upon receipt of not ce of argument, counsel should 
immediately check his or her CL endar. Existing conflicts should 
ordinarily give way to the scheduled argument. Attendance at the 
Court of Appeals is a sufficient excuse for changing most 
depositions and meetings. A narrow range of existing conflicts 
may warrant a change of time for the appellate argument as 
scheduled, at least if a partner or associate can not capably 
make the argument. A first place trial setting in a case that 
will not be settled, a long-planned vacation where non-refundable 
arrangements have been made, and scheduled medical or surgical 
procedures may be examples. However, to minimize disruption for 
opposing counsel as well as the court, a motion requesting a 
continuance and setting forth the problem in some detail should 
be filed within a few days of receipt of the notice—not within a 
few days prior to argument. Once argument has been set, one 
simply does not permit inconsistent obligations to come into 
existence thereafter. There are few reasons for avoiding the 
setting of depositions, trials, or hearings better than "I am 
scheduled at the Court of Appeals that morning." 
Unless a well-supported motion to continue has been filed 
within a few days of receipt of our notice of argument, or 
argument is formally waived, we simply expect counsel to appear 
as scheduled unless an actual emergency, not reasonably to have 
been anticipated, arises - id is wrought to our attention as 
promptly as po: ible. If argument has not been previously waived 
as a matter of informed judgment, we assume the case merits 
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argument, in which event it is simply unprofessional to just be a 
"no-show" even if a legitimate emergency has arisen. 
Gregory K. Orate, Judge 
900562-CA 5 
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DEAN N. ZABRISKIE #3599 
Attorney for Defendant 
3507 North University Avenue 
Jamestown Square, Suite 370 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-7680 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
APRIL GARZA, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATION THAT 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT IS NOT 
NEEDED ON APPEAL 
Case No. 89140301(2) 
Judge George E. Ballif 
COMES NOW defendant, April Garza, by and through counsel, 
Dean N. Zabriskie, and hereby certifies that, in light of the 
plea bargain agreement between the parties, a trial transcript is 
not necessary for the purposes of appeal in this case. 
Therefore, defendant respectfully requests that this matter be 
certified for appeal. 
rN 
DATED and signed this w _day of November, 1990. 
idu~ .w Z^-Z_ 
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, postage pre-paid, this ?i) day of November, 1990, to 
Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 
84601 and to R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol 
Bu"d i„g , s a l t Lake c ± t y ' UT 8 4 m \KMl!(imzL~^ 
Secretary 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
A Professional Corporation 
Hanover Building, Suite 370 
Jamestown Square 
3507 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801)375-7680 
December 5, 1990 
Attn: Sherry 
Utah Court of Appeals Clerks Office 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: April Garza Appeal 
Case No. 900562-CA 
Dear Sherry: 
As per your request, enclosed herein is the Certification 
That Trial Transcript is Not Needed on Appeal. I will prepare 
the other information you requested and forward that to you* 
Thank you, 
LISA RICKENBACH 
Secretary for Dean Zabriskie 
1NTH DISTRICT COURT OF COLIN H 
STATC OF UTAH 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
^ <Z/ Defendant. 
REPORTERS NOTICE OF FILING 
APPEAL TRANSCRIPT 
Case No. <^XL J-9 J>Q / 
The above-captioned transcript has been filed with the Clerk of the District Court on the 
^ " ^ S f a v of < ^ 
^ 
'^^-T-~C^-- . 19 ^ X 
A copy of this notice has been mailed to counsel of record. 
""C- < 2 l ^ 
CC: 
7*. s€~ 
SP-AE0211 
£Utifc(T V 
1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969).1 Thus, in the instant case, the 
officer did not have reason to conclude that appellant was 
involved in criminal activity. Appellant had merely purchased 
legal lab equipment at a public store. Therefore, the "stop" 
constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of appellant's 
Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the evidence obtained by 
the unreasonablbe seizure is tainted as fruit of the poisonous 
tree and should be suppressed. 
II. APPELLANT LACKED THE INTENT REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. 
SECTION 58-37a-3 TO MAKE HER ALLEGED POSSESSION 
OF THE SUBJECT EQUIPMENT VIOLATIVE OF 
THE CRIMINAL STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37a-3 defines drug paraphernalia 
as follows: 
'Drug Paraphernalia' means any equipment, product, or 
material used or intended for use, to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
package, repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, 
ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of Chapter 
37, Title 58 . . . . 
The intent defined in the above-statute must be established in 
appellant in order for appellant to be convicted of the alleged 
1
 In Davis, the Supreme Court of the United States stated: 
Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers 
of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy 
incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more 
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to 
prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security 
of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 
'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions.' 
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detention and therefore is an encounter requiring reasonable, 
articulable suspicion". State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 
(Utah App. 1988). In State v. Talbot, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 
(Utah App. 1990), the Court of Appeals summarized recent 
developments of the law applicable to "reasonable suspicion" 
inquiries into three general principles: 
First, a reasonable suspicion must be based upon 
objective facts which indicate the existence of 
criminal activity. Second, the officer must be able to 
articulate what it is about those facts which leads to 
an inference of criminal activity. If the officer is 
unable to articulate what facts and inferences led to 
his suspicion, the suspicion is classified as a mere 
hunch and will not justify the subsequent stop. 
Finally, the facts must be judged against an objective 
standard: would the facts available to the officer at 
the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a 
person of reasonable caution in the belief" that the 
action taken was appropriate? Anything less would 
invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed 
rights based on nothing more substantial than 
inarticulate hunches. 
Id. (citations omitted)* 
Further, many courts have held that a discretionary stop to 
conduct investigatory field interrogation constitutes an unlawful 
"seizure" within tjie meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See State 
v. Puiq, 534 P.2# 447 (Ariz. 1975); See also State v. Bonds. 577 
P.2d 781 (Hi. /978). Here the purpose of the "stop" was to 
investigate the conduct of appellant and Leonard. In Terry. 
supra, th^ court stated that the "seizure" of a person is only 
reasonable where a police officer observes unusual conduct which 
leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal activity may be 
afoot. See also, Davis v. Mississippi. 394 U.S* 721, 89 S.Ct. 
3 
crime. Furthermore, a conviction of possession of drug 
paraphernalia cannot be had on the basis of transferred intent or 
guilt by association. State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 
1983). 
In Murphy, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: "It has 
further been generally held that the exemplar items are not 
(drug) paraphernalia per se but only become so when coupled with 
the seller's intent that it be so used." Id. at 1223.2 Further, 
in Murphy, the Court delineated the following elements the State 
must prove before a valid conviction under U.C.A. Section 58-37a-
3 can be had: 
1. The objects were drug paraphernalia as defined by 
the statute (in other words, the defendant delivered 
the items intending that they be used for the 
production or consumption of controlled substances); 
2. The defendant delivered the items knowing that the 
buyer of the item would thereafter use them with 
controlled substances. 
In the instant case, the State did not prove that appellant knew 
or reasonably should have known that the subject equipment was 
going to be used with controlled substances. See Murphy, supra, 
at 1224. Therefore, it cannot be reasonably inferred that 
appellant had the requisite intent to make said possession 
criminal. 
2
 In Murphv, the court held that because the State presented 
no evidence as to what appellant knew or did not know concerning 
the sale in question, it was legally and factually impossible to 
infer intent on appellant's part. Thus, the court held that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction. 
5 
Absent the requisite intent making the mere possession of 
lab equipment a crime, it is improper for police officers to 
seize such equipment. Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th 
Cir. 1985). In determining whether the intent does indeed exist, 
the court in Delaware Accessories Trad Ass'n v. Gebelein. 497 F. 
Supp. 289 (D.Del. 1980), said that "even the illicit dealer, 
however, is not held legally responsible. . . . for guessing what 
is in th6\|nind of a buyer. The seller is safe as long as he does 
not actually know the buyer's purpose and as long as the 
objective facts\:hat are there for him to observe do not give 
fair notice that illegal use will ensue." Likewise, in the 
instant case, to the knowledge of appellant they were purchasing 
the equipment for a person in Salt Lake City; the purpose for 
which the equipment was to be used was unknown, or uncertain at 
best as far as appellant was concerned. 
Moreover, in Murphy, supra, the court stated: 
Utah has modified the language of the Model Act so as 
to strictly require that a person know that the buyer 
will use the paraphernalia for illegal purposes. . . 
The few courts that have addressed that language have 
held that the language requires an actual knowledge by 
the accused. 
Murphy, supra, at 1224; See also, Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 
453 A.2d 209 (N.J. Super A.D. 1982). "Absent an admission from 
the purchaser as to his intent, neither a merchant nor a 
policeman would have objective criteria upon which to base a 
reasonable belief that an item purchased is to be used with 
controlled substances." Id. at 215. 
A case decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court is instructive 
6 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
April Garza, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
DEC 111991 
%IaM^a'— 
^ p r y T Noonan 
Oktk of the Court 
i/iah Court of Appeaia 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Russon. 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed November 21, 1991, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this // day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
^$35£ 
Norman H. Jackson.^Tudge W 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
I dissent. 
Gregory K^Orme, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of December, 1991, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to the parties 
listed below: 
Dean N. Zabriskie 
Attorney at Law 
3 507 North University Avenue 
Jamestown Square, Suite 370 
Provo, Utah 84604 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING was hand-delivered to a personal 
representative of the Attorney General's Office, to be delivered 
to the each of the parties listed below: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
Judith S.H. Atherton 
Assistant Attorney General 
Governmental Affairs 
23 6 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Dated this 11th day of December, 1991. 
BY v *$/M( Atf/rftA 
Deputy cferk ' 
